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INTRODUCTION 
Megan Meier, Phoebe Connop, Ryan Halligan, Jesse Logan, Hope 
Sitwell, Jamey Rodemeyer, Amanda, Todd, and Katlin Loux all died before 
their 19th birthdays.1 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2018, by RANDALL MORGAN BRIGGS. 
 1. See Megan’s Story, MEGAN MEIER FOUND., http://www.meganmeierfound 
ation.org/megans-story.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2017) [https://perma.cc/RN7V-GV 
4K]; Mark Hodge & Ian Murphy, ‘AN ABSOLUTE TRAGEDY’ Schoolgirl hanged 
herself over fears of online backlash over racially offensive Instagram snap, SUN 
(Aug. 28, 2016), https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1687224/schoolgirl-hanged-herself-
over-fears-of-online-backlash-over-racially-offensive-instagram-snap/ [https://perma 
.cc/499E-UB2B]; John Halligan & Kelly Halligan, Ryan’s Story, http://www.ryan 
patrickhalligan.org (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9V53-BUEG]; Mike 
Celizic, Her teen committed suicide over ‘sexting’, TODAY PARENTS (Mar. 6, 2009, 
8:26 AM), http://www.today.com/parents/her-teen-committed-suicide-over-sexting-
2D80555048 [https://perma.cc/HJV4-DV9H]; Patience Ley, Cyber Bullying, PREZI 
(Mar. 18, 2014), https://prezi.com/mxhrody4tlkx/cyber-bullying/ [https://perma.cc 
/8NYW-DNU8]; Michelle Dean, The Story Of Amanda Todd, NEW YORKER (Oct. 
18, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/the-story-of-amanda-
todd [https://perma.cc/HRV4-CY59]; Susan Donaldson James, Jamey Rodemeyer 
Suicide: Police Consider Criminal Bullying Charges, ABC NEWS (Sept. 22, 2011), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/jamey-rodemeyer-suicide-ny-police-open-criminal-in  
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Jesse lost her life at age 18.2 Phoebe was 16 years old.3 Amanda was 
15.4 Jamey was 14.5 Ryan,6 Hope,7 and Megan8 were 13. Katlin, who lived 
a few miles south of Shreveport, Louisiana, had just graduated from high 
school.9 She was 17.10 What was the cause of these young peoples’ premature 
deaths? They were victims of suicide provoked by cyberbullying.11 
                                                                                                             
vestigation/story?id=14580832 [https://perma.cc/6AKG-HTUS]; Loresha Wilson, 
Louisiana teen deaths highlight dangers of bullying, USA TODAY (Sept. 26, 2013, 
5:50 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/25/student-bullying-
suicides/2867781/ [https://perma.cc/4P5H-4ZYZ]. 
 2. Celizic, supra note 1 (recounting Jesse Logan’s suicide after her ex-
boyfriend shared nude photographs of her with their classmates). 
 3. Hodge & Murphy, supra note 1 (explaining 16-year-old Phoebe Connop’s 
suicide after her peers cyberbullied her for making racially insensitive remarks). 
 4. Dean, supra note 1 (recounting Amanda Todd’s suicide after a man took nude 
photographs of her during an online chat session and sent them to her classmates). 
 5. James, supra note 1 (recounting Jamey Rodemeyer’s suicide after he was 
bullied online with homophobic slurs). 
 6. Halligan & Halligan, supra note 1 (detailing Ryan Halligan’s suicide after 
experiencing pervasive bullying during face-to-face confrontations and online 
communication). 
 7. Ley, supra note 1 (detailing Hope Sidwell’s suicide after her ex-boyfriend 
shared nude photos of her with their classmates). 
 8. Megan’s Story, supra note 1 (detailing 13-year-old Megan Meier’s 
suicide after she was catfished and cyberbullied, via social media, by an adult in 
her neighborhood).  
 9. Wilson, supra note 1. 
 10. Id. (explaining the story of Katlin Loux’s tragic suicide one week after 
her high school graduation because of pervasive bullying). 
 11. There is no uniform definition of cyberbullying. See, e.g., NANCY 
WILLARD, EDUCATOR’S GUIDE TO CYBERBULLYING AND CYBERTHREATS 1 (Apr. 
2007), https://education.ohio.gov/getattachment/Topics/Other-Resources/School-
Safety/Safe-and-Supportive-Learning/Anti-Harassment-Intimidation-and-Bullying 
-Resource/Educator-s-Guide-Cyber-Safety.pdf.aspx (defining cyberbullying as 
“cruel[ty] to others by sending or posting harmful material or engaging in other 
forms of social aggression using the Internet or other digital technologies”) 
[https://perma.cc/ZSJ5-T5ZY]; MARCI FELDMAN HERTZ & CORINNE DAVID-
FERDON, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND 
YOUTH VIOLENCE: A CDC ISSUE BRIEF FOR EDUCATORS AND CAREGIVERS 3 (Jan. 
2009), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/EA-brief-a.pdf (defining 
cyberbullying as “any kind of aggression perpetrated through technology—any type 
of harassment or bullying (teasing, telling lies, making fun of someone, making rude 
or mean comments, spreading rumors, or making threatening or aggressive 
comments) that occurs through email, a chat room, instant messaging, a website 
(including blogs), or text messaging”) [https://perma.cc/9GUX-NVAG]. Louisiana 
defines cyberbullying as the “transmission of any electronic textual, visual, written, or 
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Each of these tragic suicides is sufficient to provoke an emotional 
response that, in turn, spurs corrective or preventative legislative action.12 
Beyond simple emotionalism, a recurring problem that has created an 
observable and detrimental harm to society, such as cyberbullying, 
justifies legislative response.13 Pervasive cyberbullying frequently impacts 
academic decisions,14 leads to real-world confrontations,15 and too often 
culminates in tragic suicides.16 
In 2015, 34% of middle school students surveyed reported experiencing 
cyberbullying.17 Children are particularly vulnerable to the damaging effects 
of cyberbullying because their brains are still developing.18 Cyberbullying 
                                                                                                             
oral communication with the malicious and willful intent to coerce, abuse, torment, or 
intimidate a person under the age of eighteen.” LA. REV. STAT. § 14:40.7 (2017). 
 12. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 565.090 (2017) (“A person commits the 
crime of harassment if he or she . . . [k]nowingly frightens, intimidates, or causes 
emotional distress to another person by anonymously making a telephone call or 
any electronic communication.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 1. Cyberbullying has become so pervasive 
that it has appeared on prominent societal icons, such as South Park. See Peter 
Anthony, ‘South Park’ Season 19 Episode 5: Top 5 Moments From ‘Safe Space’ 
[RECAP], DESIGN & TREND (Oct. 22, 2015, 12:14 PM) (on file with author).  
 14. Christina Warren, Rebecca Black Quits Middle School After Bullying, 
MASHABLE (Aug. 12, 2011), http://mashable.com/2011/08/12/rebecca-black-quits-
school-bullying-poll/#38sqn.dJnOq1 (explaining how Rebecca Black was bullied 
after becoming a viral sensation for her hit song “Friday”) [https://perma.cc/8SAE-
9PZW]. 
 15. Damon Sims, Cleveland shooting shows how cyberbullying is spreading 
and leading to real-world confrontations, CLEVELAND (Apr. 5, 2009), 
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2009/04/cleveland_shooting_shows_how_c.html  
(detailing how a social media feud between two teens led to a non-lethal shooting) 
[https://perma.cc/3Q6J-7489]. 
 16. See Megan’s Story, supra note 1 (explaining that 13-year-old Megan 
Meier committed suicide after being catfished and cyberbullied via social media 
by an adult in her neighborhood); Hodge & Murphy, supra note 1 (explaining 
how 16-year-old Phoebe Connop committed suicide after being cyberbullied by 
her peers for making racially insensitive remarks). 
 17. Samir Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, 2015 Cyberbullying Data, 
CYBERBULLYING RES. CTR. (May 1, 2015), http://cyberbullying.org/2015-data 
[https://perma.cc/7WP2-9AP6]. 
 18. Linda Spear, Adolescent Brain Development, 8 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & 
CLINICAL L. 11, 19 (2006) (asserting that emotional environments make it 
difficult for adolescents to focus vis-a-vis executive functions). 
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often leads to adolescent suicide19 and contributes to the fact that suicide is 
the second leading cause of death in the United States for people between 
ages 15 and 24.20  
Cyberbullying poses a significant danger because people can access 
forms of electronic communication almost anywhere at any time.21 
Cyberbullying adversely affects victims in numerous observable ways, 
including “lowering self-esteem, increasing depression, and producing 
feelings of powerlessness.”22 Accordingly, cyberbullying contributes to 
school problems, anti-social behavior, substance use, and delinquency.23 
These issues are just some of the reasons that individual states have 
adopted cyberbullying legislation.24 This legislation, however, must not 
infringe First Amendment rights.25 
                                                                                                             
 19. See, e.g., Megan’s Story, supra note 1 (detailing 13-year-old Megan 
Meier’s suicide after she was catfished and cyberbullied via social media by an 
adult in her neighborhood).  
 20. See CHRISTOPHER W. DRAPEAU & JOHN L. MCINTOSH, AM. ASS’N OF 
SUICIDOLOGY, U.S.A. SUICIDE: 2013 OFFICIAL FINAL DATA (Apr. 24, 2015), 
http://www.suicidology.org/Portals/14/docs/Resources/FactSheets/2013datapgsv
3.pdf [https://perma.cc/YVN3-UBZ4]. 
 21. Jenn Anderson, Mary Bresnahan & Catherine Musatics, Combating 
Weight-Based Cyberbullying on Facebook with the Dissenter Effect, 17 
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY, BEHAV. & SOC. NETWORKING 281, 281 (2014) (arguing that 
online bullying is more dangerous than traditional bullying for several reasons. 
First, online bullying is easier to engage in because of increased anonymity and 
decreased internal censorship. Second, online bullying is more pervasive than 
traditional bullying, partly because perpetrators can use a broad range of 
platforms, including web sites, cell phones, e-mail, and instant messaging. Third, 
online bullying comments are often permanently, and repeatedly, visible by 
victims and their peers). 
 22. Id.  
 23. Cyberbullying Facts, CYBERBULLYING RES. CTR., http://cyberbullying 
.org/facts (last visited Oct. 29, 2017) [https://perma.cc/W9Y9-QT9F]. 
 24. See, e.g., Phil Prazan, After teen’s suicide David’s Law hopes to prevent 
cyber-bullying, KXAN (Nov. 13, 2016, 11:32 PM), http://kxan.com/2016/11/13 
/davids-law-hopes-to-stem-cyber-bullying-in-texas/ [https://perma.cc/Y88B-SMPF]; 
see also Samir Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, A Brief Review of State Cyberbullying 
Laws and Policies, CYBERBULLYING RES. CTR. (Jan. 2016), https://cyberbullying.org 
/Bullying-and-Cyberbullying-Laws.pdf (listing Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, 
Nevada, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington as states that criminalize 
cyberbullying at the time of the last update). 
 25. See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 820 (N.C. 2016). 
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The First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech and protects that 
right from arbitrary government intrusion.26 Although the First 
Amendment does not protect all speech, it does protect offensive or 
disagreeable speech.27 For speech to be restricted by the government, the 
Constitution requires that the speech be more than merely offensive or 
undesirable.28 The United States Supreme Court has declined to address 
how First Amendment protections apply to cyberbullying prohibitions.29 
In the Supreme Court’s silence, state legislatures, including Louisiana’s, 
have passed criminal cyberbullying statutes.30  
This Comment asserts that Louisiana’s criminal cyberbullying statute 
is unconstitutional because it extends beyond the exceptions to First 
Amendment protections recognized by the Supreme Court and the United 
States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and thus criminalizes constitutionally 
                                                                                                             
 26. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (“The First 
Amendment . . . prohibits the enactment of laws ‘abridging the freedom of speech.’” 
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend I)). In a 2017 decision, the Supreme Court recognized 
that the First Amendment protects the right to engage in free speech on social media. 
The Court likened social media to the traditional town square. Packingham v. North 
Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (“[P]rohibiting sex offenders from using 
[social media], . . . bars access to . . . speaking and listening in the modern public 
square . . . . [Social media] can provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms 
available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard.”). 
 27. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (finding that a federal law 
prohibiting disparaging trademarks “violates the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment. It offends a bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may not be 
banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”); id. at 1764 (“Speech that 
demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other 
similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is 
that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’” (quoting United 
States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting))); Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the 
First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an 
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”). 
 28. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 408 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016) (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)). 
 29. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016) (denying 
certiorari where discipline of a student was upheld for posting a rap to Facebook 
and YouTube that threatened violence on school teachers); Kowalski v. Berkeley 
Cty. Schs., 565 U.S. 1173 (2012) (denying writ when the student’s creation of an 
online chat room to ridicule a fellow student was upheld); Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. v. J.S. 
ex rel. Snyder, 565 U.S. 1156 (2012) (denying writ when a student was protected 
by the First Amendment when she created a false online profile of her principal). 
 30. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-217 (2017); LA. REV. STAT. § 14:40.7 (2017). 
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protected speech.31 Louisiana should amend its statute to provide the 
greatest possible protection for children while conforming to the 
requirements of both the First Amendment and the Louisiana Constitution. 
Part I of this Comment discusses the history and significance of the 
fundamental right of free speech in the United States and exceptions to 
First Amendment protections recognized by the Supreme Court. Part II 
explores Supreme Court jurisprudence and subsequent lower court 
decisions regarding speech relevant to criminalizing cyberbullying. Part 
III analyzes the constitutionality of Louisiana’s cyberbullying statute 
under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the 
Louisiana Constitution. Part IV proposes changes to the statute to provide 
the greatest constitutional protection for children.  
I. EXPLORING THE HISTORY OF THE RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
The United States’ founders believed certain fundamental rights were 
granted by Nature and its Creator.32 The government could not abridge these 
fundamental rights because they did not flow from government and were 
not surrendered by the people.33 The United States Constitution expressly 
                                                                                                             
 31. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 32. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these 
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights . . . .”). This understanding of natural rights can 
be traced throughout history to earlier thinkers, such as England’s John Locke. See 
generally MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE NEW REPUBLICANISM 
187–215 (2011) (explaining Locke’s insistence that natural law comes from a Creator). 
 33. See VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 1 (1776) (“That all men are by 
nature equally free and independent and have certain inherent rights, of which, when 
they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their 
posterity.”); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *124 (“For the principal aim 
of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights, which 
were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. 
IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to 
deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). 
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recognized freedom of speech as one of these fundamental rights34 in 
1791.35 Nevertheless, these rights were never considered absolute.36 
A. Government as the Protector of Individual Rights 
The Declaration of Independence declares that governments are 
formed to protect fundamental rights.37 Historically, commentators have 
recognized protecting fundamental rights as one of government’s most 
significant functions.38 When giving the government the power necessary 
to protect individual rights, it is necessary to ensure that government itself 
does not impermissibly infringe upon individual’s exercise of these 
fundamental rights.39 Consequently, the American people adopted the first 
                                                                                                             
 34. Fundamental Right, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“(1) A 
right derived from natural or fundamental law. (2) Constitutional law. A significant 
component of liberty, encroachments of which are rigorously tested by courts to 
ascertain the soundness of purported governmental justifications.”). 
 35. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) (“The freedom of speech and 
of the press, which are secured by the First Amendment against abridgment by the 
United States, are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are 
secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a state.”). 
 36. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (“[T]he right 
of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”); see also 
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 957 
(1919) (“‘Your right to swing your arms ends just where the other man’s nose 
begins.’ To find the boundary line of any right, we must get behind rules of law to 
human facts. In our problem, we must regard the desires and needs of the individual 
human being who wants to speak and those of the great group of human beings 
among whom he speaks. That is, in technical language, there are individual interests 
and social interests, which must be balanced against each other, if they conflict, in 
order to determine which interest shall be sacrificed under the circumstances and 
which shall be protected and become the foundation of a legal right.”). 
 37. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“That to 
secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed.”). 
 38. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *124 (“Hence it 
follows, that the first and primary end of human laws is to maintain and regulate 
these absolute rights of individuals.”). 
 39. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“If men were angels, no 
government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor 
internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is 
to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable 
the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. 
A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but 
experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.”). 
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ten amendments to the Constitution, commonly known as the Bill of 
Rights,40 as checks on the federal government’s power.41  
The Constitution’s First Amendment guarantees American citizens’ 
fundamental right to freedom of speech with a clear and resounding 
declaration: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press.”42 Although the plain text limits only Congress’s 
                                                                                                             
 40. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X. See Bill Of Rights Of The United States Of 
America (1791), BILL OF RIGHTS INST., https://www.billofrightsinstitute.org 
/founding-documents/bill-of-rights/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2017) [https://perma.cc 
/WLV9-97QN]. Historical precursors to the Bill of Rights include the Magna 
Carta that restricted the power of the King. See Magna Carta: Muse and Mentor: 
Executive Power, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/magna-
carta-muse-and-mentor/executive-power.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) [https: 
//perma.cc/7945-2EAJ]. The Library of Congress explains the Magna Carta’s 
historical importance because 
[f]or centuries Magna Carta has stood for the principle that no man is 
above the law, not even a king. Although King John’s Magna Carta does 
not explicitly articulate this idea, it did create checks designed to restrain 
the king whenever he failed to uphold the terms of the charter. . . . the 
understanding that any act by the king or one of his agents that violated the 
terms of the charter was void, and, in the language of Edward I’s 1297 
Confirmation of the Charters, “should be undone and holden for naught.” 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra. 
 41. See BILL OF RIGHTS INST., supra note 40. The Bill of Rights was adopted 
as part of a compromise between federalist and anti-federalist factions to ratify 
the Constitution. RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 389–90 (2009). 
 42. U.S. CONST. amend I. As the first individual right expressly protected from 
governmental intrusion, the freedom of speech holds a venerated position in 
American society. See From George Washington to Officers of the Army, 15 March 
1783, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-
01-02-10840 (last updated June 29, 2017) [https://perma.cc/4PHA-TPPG]. George 
Washington wrote a letter to his army officers explaining free speech’s importance: 
[I]f Men are to be precluded from offering their sentiments on a matter, 
which may involve the most serious and alarming consequences, that can 
invite the consideration of Mankind; reason is of no use to us—the 
freedom of Speech may be taken away—and, dumb & silent we may be 
led, like sheep, to the Slaughter. 
FOUNDERS ONLINE, supra; see also Extract Thomas Jefferson to Archibald Stuart, 
JEFFERSON QUOTES AND FAMILY LETTERS, http://tjrs.monticello.org/letter/139 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2017) (“I would rather be exposed to the inconveniencies 
attending too much liberty than those attending too small a degree of it.”) 
[https://perma.cc/5KXV-698N].  
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power, the First Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment43 and 
the doctrine of incorporation,44 precludes each state from violating the 
rights the Amendment protects.45 Each state, therefore, is prohibited from 
restricting speech protected by the First Amendment.46  
B. The Supreme Court’s Recognition of Permissible Restrictions on 
Speech 
The First Amendment prohibits the government from “restrict[ing] 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its 
                                                                                                             
 43. U.S. CONST. amend XIV (providing that no state may “deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”). 
 44. The doctrine of incorporation provides that certain Bill of Rights 
protections are enforced against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (“The First Amendment, 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the enactment 
of laws abridging the freedom of speech.”); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
561 U.S. 742, 764 (2010) (“[I]ncorporated Bill of Rights protections ‘are all to be 
enforced against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same 
standards that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment.’” (quoting 
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964))). 
 45. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (finding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment precluded state legislatures from passing laws violating 
the free exercise of religion enshrined in the First Amendment). Before the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the incorporation doctrine, the Supreme Court held 
that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states. In Barron v. City of Baltimore, 
the Supreme Court stated that  
[i]n almost every convention by which the constitution was adopted, 
amendments to guard against the abuse of power were recommended. 
These amendments demanded security against the apprehended 
encroachments of the general government not against those of the local 
governments. . . . These amendments contain no expression indicating 
an intention to apply them to the state governments. This court cannot so 
apply them. We are of opinion, that the provision in the fifth amendment 
to the constitution . . . is intended solely as a limitation on the exercise 
of power by the government of the United States, and is not applicable 
to the legislation of the states. 
Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250–51 (1833).  
 46. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) 
(“The Constitution says that Congress (and the States) may not abridge the right 
to free speech. This provision means what it says.”). 
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content.”47 Speech does not have to be beneficial or useful to enjoy First 
Amendment protections.48 As a general rule, a law restricting speech 
because of the content of its message, such as an cyberbullying statute, 
must survive strict scrutiny to be constitutional.49 
When analyzing cyberbullying laws, there are two notable potential 
exceptions to applying strict scrutiny. First, a state actor may prohibit 
speech when its content concerns a traditionally limited genre of speech.50 
Second, speech may be limited in cases related to schools if the restriction 
complies with Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District51 and its progeny.52 
1. Applying Strict Scrutiny to Content-Based Laws 
A law is content-based if it restricts speech because of the “topic 
discussed or the idea or message expressed.”53 Further, a law is content-
based if it cannot be justified “without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech” or if the law was passed “because of disagreement with 
the message.”54 Conversely, a content-neutral speech restriction “serves 
                                                                                                             
 47. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (internal 
quotation mark omitted) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 
U.S. 60, 65 (1983)). 
 48. See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 576 (2011) (“Speech 
remains protected even when it may stir people to action, move them to tears, or 
inflict great pain.”) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 49. Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (stating that to 
survive strict scrutiny, there must be both a compelling state interest, and the state 
must choose the least restrictive means in achieving that interest). 
 50. True threats, incitement, obscenity, and fighting words have traditionally 
been restricted without raising First Amendment concerns. See id. at 791. 
 51. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (holding that conduct by a student on campus—
conduct that materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or 
invasion of the rights of others—is not immunized by the First Amendment right to 
free speech). 
 52. See, e.g., Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 394 (5th Cir. 2015), 
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016) (extending Tinker to reach speech made online 
off-campus). 
 53. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015). Cyberbullying laws 
are usually content-based restrictions because they criminalize or restrict speech 
based upon its bullying message. See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 820 
(N.C. 2016). 
 54. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 
U.S. 781, 791(1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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purposes unrelated to the content of expression.”55 A court is required to 
determine if a challenged regulation “on its face” distinguishes protected 
and criminalized speech “based on the message a speaker conveys.”56 
Suppressing speech because of its content generally is presumed 
unconstitutional.57 
Strict scrutiny is a heightened form of review used by courts to 
determine a law’s constitutionality.58 To withstand strict scrutiny, a 
content-based speech regulation must promote a compelling state interest 
and embody the least restrictive means to further that interest so that the 
regulation does not “unnecessarily interfer[e]” with freedoms protected by 
the First Amendment.59 Strict scrutiny sometimes has been called “‘strict’ 
in theory and fatal in fact.”60 One scholar’s research shows that only 22% 
of statutes analyzed in free speech cases survived strict scrutiny.61  
                                                                                                             
 55. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. The Supreme Court stated how a speech restriction 
is content-neutral: 
The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases 
generally . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of 
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. . . . The 
government's purpose is the controlling consideration. A regulation that 
serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, 
even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not 
others. . . . Government regulation of expressive activity is content 
neutral so long as it is justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citations omitted). 
 56. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (quoting Sorrel v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 
552, 566 (2011)). 
 57. Id. at 2226 (“Content-based laws . . . are presumptively unconstitutional 
and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored 
to serve compelling state interests.”). 
 58. See Strict scrutiny, EXPLORING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, https://www.law 
.cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny (last visited Oct. 29, 2017) [https://perma.cc/8E3M 
-KW78]. 
 59. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
 60. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., 
concurring) (defining “conventional ‘strict scrutiny’” as “scrutiny that is strict in 
theory, but fatal in fact” because strict scrutiny is difficult to survive); see also 
Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on A Changing Court: 
A Model for A Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972); Bernal v. 
Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 n.6 (1984) (“Only rarely are statutes sustained in the 
face of strict scrutiny.”). 
 61. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis 
of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 851 (2006). The 
same study found that although “the Supreme Court (25%) and the district courts 
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Content-based speech restrictions rarely survive strict scrutiny.62 The 
Supreme Court decided such a rare case when it upheld a state statute 
prohibiting electioneering within 100 feet of polling places because the 
law furthered a compelling state interest—having free and effective 
elections63—by the least restrictive means.64 On the other hand, a statute 
purporting to protect children from obscene messages did not survive strict 
scrutiny because the statute went beyond what was necessary to further the 
state’s compelling interest by also denying “adult access to telephone 
messages which were indecent.”65 Additionally, a law prohibiting a church 
and its pastor from displaying temporary directional signs announcing 
service times and locations failed to survive strict scrutiny because the 
statute was not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.66 
Nevertheless, a content-based speech restriction that otherwise would fail 
to survive strict scrutiny is constitutional if the law restrains a traditionally 
restricted genre of speech.67  
                                                                                                             
(23%) uphold laws at similar rates, the circuit courts of appeal are much more 
likely to uphold a law (39%)” under strict scrutiny. Id. at 826. Winkler concludes 
that his study conclusively shows that “strict scrutiny is survivable in practice and 
not fatal in fact.” Id. at 871. 
 62. See Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (“It is rare 
that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be 
permissible.” (quoting United States v. Playboy Ent. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 
818 (2000))). 
 63. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 208 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
 64. Id. at 211 (“Accordingly, it is sufficient to say that in establishing a 100–
foot boundary, Tennessee is on the constitutional side of the line.”). 
 65. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989). 
 66. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2232. The Supreme Court held that the sign restriction 
failed strict scrutiny because 
[t]he Town has offered no reason to believe that directional signs pose a 
greater threat to safety than do ideological or political signs. If anything, 
a sharply worded ideological sign seems more likely to distract a driver 
than a sign directing the public to a nearby church meeting. In light of 
this underinclusiveness, the Town has not met its burden to prove that its 
Sign Code is narrowly tailored to further a compelling government 
interest. 
Id.  
 67. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717–18 (2012) (reciting 
content-based restrictions on speech that have been permitted in a few historical 
categories, including incitement, fighting words, and true threats). 
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2. Speech Traditionally Limited Due to the Content of its Message 
Certain genres of speech traditionally have been limited because the 
message conveyed does not violate the First Amendment.68 The Supreme 
Court has observed that limiting these “well-defined and narrowly limited 
classes of speech” does not impermissibly infringe upon constitutional 
rights.69 These traditionally restricted classes or genres include fighting 
words,70 obscenity,71 incitement,72 and true threats.73 Because the First 
Amendment does not protect these types of speech, they can be restricted 
without violating the Constitution.74 
a. The “Fighting Words” Exception 
“Fighting words” are words “[that] by their very utterance inflict 
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”75 Fighting 
words provide no benefit to social discourse; any value derived from 
fighting words is outweighed by the damage caused to societal interests.76 
As such, fighting words do not convey any information or opinion 
protected by the Constitution and may be restricted.77 
                                                                                                             
 68. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are 
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and 
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”). 
 69. Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790–91 (2011) (explaining 
that obscenity, incitement, and fighting words “represent well-defined and 
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have 
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem” (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 
U.S. at 571–72)). 
 70. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
 71. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957). 
 72. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (per curiam). 
 73. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (“[T]he First Amendment 
also permits a State to ban a true threat.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 74. 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 633 (8th Cir. 2011) (“The 
categories of speech that the Supreme Court has found fall outside the First 
Amendment include fighting words, obscenity, child pornography, and 
defamation; statutes restricting speech from one of these categories are not subject 
to strict scrutiny as long as they are viewpoint-neutral.” (citing R.A.V. v. City of 
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–88 (2000))). 
 75. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
 76. Id. (“[Fighting words] are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and 
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”). 
 77. Id. 
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In Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, the Supreme Court upheld 
a statute prohibiting anyone from addressing offensive, derisive, or 
annoying words that had a “direct tendency to cause acts of violence” to 
another person lawfully in a public place.78 Walter Chaplinsky was 
convicted under the statute for accusing another man and the government 
of Rochester, New Hampshire of being, among other things, fascist.79 The 
Court held that this law did not violate the First Amendment because the 
statute was “narrowly drawn and limited to define and punish specific 
conduct lying within the domain of state power.”80 Thus, the Court held 
that Chaplinsky’s conviction under the statute was constitutionally 
permissible because his “fighting words” were likely to cause an 
immediate breach of the peace.81 
Courts have greatly limited the fighting words doctrine since 
Chaplinsky.82 One scholar notes the existence of a “strong body of law 
expressly limiting the fighting words doctrine to face-to-face confrontations 
likely to provoke immediate violence.”83 Further, the Supreme Court has not 
upheld a “fighting words” conviction since Chaplinsky in 1942.84  
b. The “Obscene Material” Exception 
In addition to the fighting words doctrine, the Supreme Court has 
upheld restrictions on speech that contains obscene material.85 Obscene 
                                                                                                             
 78. Id at 573. 
 79. Id. at 569. Chaplinsky’s complaint alleged that 
appellant ‘with force and arms, in a certain public place in said city of 
Rochester, to wit, on the public sidewalk on the easterly side of 
Wakefield Street, near unto the entrance of the City Hall, did unlawfully 
repeat, the words following, addressed to the complainant, that is to say, 
‘You are a God damned racketeer’ and ‘a damned Fascist and the whole 
government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists’ the same 
being offensive, derisive and annoying words and names’. 
Id.  
 80. Id. at 573. 
 81. Id. at 574. 
 82. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
1034 (4th ed. 2011). 
 83. Rodney A. Smolla, Words “Which by Their Very Utterance Inflict 
Injury”: The Evolving Treatment of Inherently Dangerous Speech in Free Speech 
Law and Theory, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 317, 350 (2009). 
 84. Burton Caine, The Trouble with “Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire Is A Threat to First Amendment Values and Should Be Overruled, 88 
MARQ. L. REV. 441, 444 (2004). 
 85. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
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material “deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient86 interest” and 
is not protected by the First Amendment.87 To determine whether material 
appeals to a prurient interest, the court asks whether the material 
“offend[s] the common conscience of the community by present-day 
standards.”88 A statute regulating obscene material must regulate speech 
that depicts or describes sexual conduct and specifically define the 
prohibited speech.89 Further, the obscenity statute must concern works 
appealing to that prurient interest, “which portray[s] sexual conduct in a 
patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do[es] not have 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”90 
In Roth v. United States, Samuel Roth was charged with “mailing 
obscene circulars and advertising, and an obscene book, in violation of the 
federal obscenity statute.”91 Federal law provided that “[e]very obscene, 
lewd, lascivious, or filthy book . . . or other publication of an indecent 
character; . . . [i]s declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be 
conveyed in the mails . . . .”92 The Supreme Court found that the statute 
was constitutional because the First Amendment does not protect 
obscenity; thus, the Court upheld Roth’s conviction.93  
c. The “Incitement” Exception 
In addition to obscenity, the Supreme Court has upheld restrictions on 
inciting speech. The First Amendment does not protect speech that is 
“directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to 
                                                                                                             
 86. Prurient, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dic 
tionary/prurient (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) (defining “prurient” as “marked by or 
arousing an immoderate or unwholesome interest or desire; especially: marked 
by, arousing, or appealing to sexual desire”) [https://perma.cc/QE2P-PSFG].  
 87. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 (footnote omitted). 
 88. Id. at 490. 
 89. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973) (internal citation omitted). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Roth, 354 U.S. at 480. 
 92. Id. at 479 n.1. 
 93. Id. at 484–85 (“[I]mplicit in the history of the First Amendment is the 
rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. This 
rejection for that reason is mirrored in the universal judgment that obscenity 
should be restrained, reflected in the international agreement of over 50 nations, 
in the obscenity laws of all of the 48 States, and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted 
by the Congress from 1842 to 1956. We hold that obscenity is not within the area 
of constitutionally protected speech or press.”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
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incite or produce such action.”94 Speech is protected, however, if it fails 
either to “incite lawless action” or if the speech is unlikely to induce the 
lawless action that the government seeks to avoid.95 For example, 
organizing, equipping, and urging people to participate in “virtual sit-ins” 
that caused website servers to slow down was incitement because virtual 
sit-ins are unlawful and the lawless conduct actually occurred.96 But 
religious protestors making vulgar and disparaging comments towards 
another religion was not inciting speech because the protestors did not 
advocate for imminent lawlessness.97 
In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., the Claiborne County, 
Mississippi chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (“NAACP”) boycotted white merchants after the chapter’s 
petition for racial equality and integration was not satisfactorily answered.98 
The boycott organizer, Charles Evers, said that “boycott violators would be 
‘disciplined’ by their own people and warned that the Sheriff could not sleep 
with boycott violators at night.”99 Further, Evers threatened, “If we catch 
any of you going in any of them racist stores, we’re gonna break your damn 
neck.”100 Even though Evers expressed himself through “emotionally 
charged rhetoric,” his speech was protected by the First Amendment 
because it did not actually incite lawless action.101 Advocating the use of 
force or violence does not strip speech of First Amendment protections if 
the speech is unlikely to induce violent action.102 
                                                                                                             
 94. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (quoting 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)). 
 95. Id.  
 96. United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A]n . . . e-
mail titled ‘Electronic Civil Disobedience,’ . . . encouraged and compelled an 
imminent, unlawful act that was not only likely to occur, but provided the 
schedule by which the unlawful act was to occur. This type of communication is 
not protected speech under [Brandenburg] . . . .”). 
 97. Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 244 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(“The only references to violence or lawlessness . . . were messages such as, 
‘Islam is a Religion of Blood and Murder,’ ‘Turn or Burn,’ and ‘Your prophet is 
a pedophile.’ These messages, however offensive, do not advocate for, encourage, 
condone, or even embrace imminent violence or lawlessness.”). 
 98. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 898–900. 
 99. Id. at 902. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 928. (“An advocate must be free to stimulate his audience with 
spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity and action in a common cause. When 
such appeals do not incite lawless action, they must be regarded as protected 
speech.”). 
 102. Id. at 927. 
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d. The “True Threats” Exception 
True threats, the fourth notable exception to First Amendment 
guarantees, are not protected by the First Amendment.103 A true threat is 
the serious expression of intent to perform an illegal violent act that is 
directed toward a particular person or group.104 The speaker does not 
actually have to intend to perform the act for the speech to constitute a true 
threat.105  
In Virginia v. Black, the Supreme Court upheld prohibitions on 
burning a cross with the intent to intimidate someone because that 
expression constituted a true threat.106 Cross burning in the United States 
is historically associated with the Ku Klux Klan.107 Crosses often were 
burnt to “serve[] as a message of intimidation, designed to inspire in the 
victim a fear of bodily harm.”108 Because cross burning often is intended 
to place recipients of the message in fear for their lives, the “First 
Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burnings done with the intent 
to intimidate.”109  
It is clear that strict scrutiny will not apply if the speech falls within a 
traditionally limited genre.110 But strict scrutiny will not automatically 
apply if a content-based speech restriction is outside of a traditionally 
limited speech genre.111 Strict scrutiny will also not apply if the restriction 
raises a pedagogical,112 or education-related, concern, which is addressed 
in Tinker and its progeny.  
II. JURISPRUDENCE RELEVANT TO CRIMINALIZING CYBERBULLYING  
States must respect federal constitutional speech protections when 
adopting cyberbullying statutes.113 The Supreme Court has specifically 
addressed a student’s constitutional rights concerning speech made on 
                                                                                                             
 103. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
 104. Id. at 359–60. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 360. 
 107. See, e.g., id. at 352 
 108. Id. at 357 (“[T]he history of violence associated with the Klan shows that 
the possibility of injury or death is not just hypothetical.”). 
 109. Id. at 363. 
 110. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 111. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988). 
 112. Pedagogical, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com 
/dictionary/pedagogical (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) (defining “pedagogical” as “of 
or relating to teachers or education”) [https://perma.cc/E36R-HGQD]. 
 113. See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 820 (N.C. 2016). 
2018] COMMENT 1077 
 
 
 
campus or at school-sponsored events.114 The Supreme Court has 
remained silent, however, regarding the intersection of online bullying and 
the First Amendment.115 Because of the Supreme Court’s silence on this 
issue, lower courts have had to determine what, if any, federal 
constitutional protections apply to bullying occurring entirely online.116 
A. Speech Limitations Furthering Legitimate Pedagogical Concerns Are 
Constitutional  
Speech restrictions relating to a school’s learning environment are not 
subject to strict scrutiny if the speech raises legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.117 In 1969, the Supreme Court in Tinker recognized that 
students’ speech enjoys First Amendment protections—but not without 
exception.118 The Court held that schools can restrict students’ speech 
made on the school’s campus if the speech disrupts the learning 
environment.119 In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has shown a 
willingness to deviate from Tinker’s stringent disruption standard to 
permit the content-based restriction of indecent speech made at a school 
                                                                                                             
 114. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 115. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016) (denying certiorari when the discipline of a student 
was upheld for posting a rap song to Facebook and YouTube—a song that 
threatened violence on school teachers); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 
565 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012) (denying certiorari when 
a student’s creation of an online chat room to ridicule a fellow student was 
upheld); Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (denying certiorari when a student creating a 
false online profile of her principal was held to be protected by the First 
Amendment). 
 116. See, e.g., Bell, 799 F.3d at 394. 
 117. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 118. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506–07. 
 119. See id. at 513. The Supreme Court noted that conduct  
by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason—whether it 
stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially disrupts 
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of 
others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of 
freedom of speech. 
Id. 
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assembly,120 controversial speech in a student newspaper,121 and off-
campus speech made at a school-sponsored event by a student encouraging 
illegal drug use.122 
1. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 
In Tinker, the Supreme Court considered students’ First Amendment 
right to engage in political speech on their high school campus by wearing 
armbands protesting the Vietnam War.123 John Tinker, Mary Beth Tinker, 
and Christopher Eckhardt were high school students who decided to object 
publicly to the Vietnam War and to express support for a truce by wearing 
small black armbands to school.124 Before the students wore the armbands 
to school, the Des Moines school system adopted a policy forbidding 
students from wearing the armbands to school.125 Under the policy, 
students wearing the armband to school would be asked to remove it.126 If 
the student refused to remove the armband he or she would be 
suspended.127  
Knowing their school’s policy, John Tinker, Mary Beth Tinker, and 
Christopher Eckhardt wore the armbands to school and were suspended.128 
There was no evidence that wearing the armbands caused any interference 
or disruption in the classroom.129 Further, the Des Moines schools did not 
prohibit wearing all political or controversial symbols—instead, the 
schools singled out wearing this specific armband protesting the Vietnam 
                                                                                                             
 120. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (digressing from 
the “substantial disruption” test, the Court held that the school district may prohibit 
lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct when made at a school assembly). 
 121. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273 (holding that a school may censor speech 
made in a student paper about controversial topics when the school’s actions are 
“reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”). 
 122. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (holding that a school may 
restrict speech made off-campus at a school sponsored event when the speech 
encourages illegal drug use). 
 123. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504 (“On December 16, Mary Beth and Christopher 
wore black armbands to their schools. John Tinker wore his armband the next day. 
They were all sent home and suspended from school until they would come back 
without their armbands.”). 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id. at 508. 
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War.130 Analyzing these facts, the Court held that students possess First 
Amendment rights at school,131 and expressing a point of view by wearing 
an armband is speech protected by the First Amendment.132 Because there 
was no evidence that wearing the armbands “might reasonably have led 
school authorities to forecast [a] substantial disruption of or material 
interference with school activities,” the Constitution prohibits state 
officials from denying students right to speech.133 
The Court further recognized that state and school officials can 
constitutionally regulate some speech in schools.134 The Court stated that 
state legislatures and school boards may restrict speech if the “conduct by 
the student, in class or out of it . . . materially disrupts classwork or 
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.”135 The 
students in Tinker peacefully wearing armbands, however, were not a 
sufficient disruption to justify suppressing the students’ speech.136  
2. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser 
In 1986, the Supreme Court announced its first deviation from the 
Tinker substantial disruption standard by expanding a school’s authority 
to restrain speech in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.137 Matthew 
Fraser nominated a fellow high school classmate for student office in front 
of a mandatory school assembly.138 During the speech, Fraser referred to 
his candidate “in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual 
                                                                                                             
 130. See id. at 510–11. 
 131. Id. at 506 (“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”). 
 132. Id. at 505. 
 133. See id. at 514. 
 134. Id. at 507 (“[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming 
the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with 
fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the 
schools.”). 
 135. Id. at 513. 
 136. Id. at 514 (“They neither interrupted school activities nor sought to intrude in 
the school affairs or the lives of others . . . . In the circumstances, our Constitution does 
not permit officials of the State to deny their form of expression.”). 
 137. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1986) 
(digressing from Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test, the Court held that the 
school district may prohibit lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct when 
made at a school assembly). 
 138. Id. at 677–78. 
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metaphor.”139 Consequently, the principal suspended Fraser for three 
days.140 In upholding Fraser’s suspension, the Supreme Court broadened 
Tinker’s material disruption standard and held that a school district may 
restrict “offensively lewd and indecent speech” that would “undermine the 
school’s basic educational mission.”141 By allowing the restriction of lewd 
or indecent speech at school, the Court broadened the school’s authority 
beyond Tinker, which required a material disruption of classwork or a 
substantial disorder before speech could be limited.142  
3. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 
Two years later, in 1988, the Supreme Court again broadened schools’ 
authority to restrict student speech in Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier by permitting schools to censor some speech before granting 
the speech the school’s imprimatur.143 In Hazelwood, a principal prevented 
the student newspaper from publishing two articles.144 The first article 
covered three students’ pregnancies.145 The principal was concerned that 
the pregnant students in the article could be identified and that an article 
concerning sexual activity and birth control was inappropriate for the 
school’s younger students.146 The second article discussed the impact of 
divorce on students.147 In refusing to publish the divorce article, the 
principal worried that a father identified in the article, who was accused of 
not spending enough time with his family prior to the divorce, had not 
been granted “an opportunity to respond to these remarks or to consent to 
their publication.”148 
Upholding the principal’s refusal to publish the students’ articles, the 
Kuhlmeier Court deviated from the Tinker standard.149 The Court held that 
a school may refuse to “lend its name and resources” to the proliferation 
                                                                                                             
 139. Id. at 678; see also id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring) (detailing some of 
Fraser’s speech: “I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his 
shirt, his character is firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, 
is firm. Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he’ll 
take an issue and nail it to the wall. . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 140. Id. at 678 (majority opinion). 
 141. Id. at 685. 
 142. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
 143. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 272–73. 
2018] COMMENT 1081 
 
 
 
of a student’s speech provided its “actions are reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”150 A school may exercise dominion over 
student speech made using school resources to ensure that participants 
learn what the activity is supposed to teach, protect consumers from being 
exposed to material inappropriate for their maturity, and prevent certain 
opinions from being erroneously attributed to the school.151 Allowing 
schools to control certain student speech made using school resources is 
another expansion of school authority beyond Tinker’s material disruption 
or substantial disorder requirement.152  
4. Morse v. Frederick 
Most recently, in 2007, the Supreme Court once again deviated from 
Tinker’s material disruption standard and broadened schools’ authority to 
restrict speech based on its content in Morse v. Frederick.153 In Morse, a 
high school principal confiscated a banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 
JESUS,” which a student, Joseph Frederick, displayed at an off-campus—
but school-sponsored—event.154 The school subsequently suspended 
Frederick.155 In upholding the restriction, the Supreme Court held that 
“schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from 
speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use.”156  
Further, the Court determined the principal reasonably “conclude[d] 
that the banner promoted illegal drug use . . . and that failing to act would 
send a powerful message to the students in her charge . . . about how 
serious the school was about the dangers of illegal drug use.”157 The First 
Amendment does not require schools to allow expression that “contributes 
to those dangers” at off-campus, school-sponsored events.158 Allowing a 
school to restrict speech promoting illegal drug use is an additional 
expansion of school authority beyond Tinker’s material disruption or 
substantial disorder requirement.159  
                                                                                                             
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 271. 
 152. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
 153. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007). 
 154. Id. at 397. 
 155. Id. at 396. 
 156. Id. at 397. 
 157. Id. at 410. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
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B. Jurisprudence Analyzing Restrictions of Cyberbullying Under the 
First Amendment 
The Supreme Court has not decided a case concerning the 
criminalization of online, off-campus speech vis-à-vis the First 
Amendment.160 In fact, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in cases 
concerning a potential cyberbully’s freedom of speech.161 Because the 
Supreme Court has not ruled on a cyberbullying case, federal circuit courts 
and state courts have developed their own standards.162 Accordingly, 
courts often apply Tinker to determine whether the bullying speech can be 
restricted because child cyberbullying cases frequently correlate with face-
to-face confrontation at school.163 
1. Bell v. Itawamba County School Board: The Fifth Circuit 
Extending Tinker  
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently articulated 
a standard for determining whether purported cyberbullying is speech 
protected by the First Amendment in Bell v. Itawamba County School 
Board.164 In Bell, Taylor Bell, a high school student, recorded and shared 
a rap song on his publicly accessible Facebook and YouTube pages when 
he was away from his school’s campus.165 In the song, Bell named two 
coaches and threatened to carry out violent acts against them.166 Bell’s rap 
also included threats to put a pistol in the coaches’ mouths and “cap” them, 
                                                                                                             
 160. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 394 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016). 
 161. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016) (denying 
certiorari when the discipline of a student was upheld for posting a rap song to 
Facebook and YouTube which threatened violence on school teachers); Kowalski 
v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 565 U.S. 1173 (2012) (denying certiorari when a student’s 
creation of an online chat room to ridicule a fellow student was upheld); Blue Mt. 
Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (denying certiorari when 
a student creating a false online profile of her principal was held to be protected 
by the First Amendment). 
 162. Mitchell J. Waldman, What Oral Statement of Student Is Sufficiently 
Disruptive so as to Fall Beyond Protection of First Amendment, 76 A.L.R. FED. 
599 (1986). 
 163. See, e.g., Bell, 799 F.3d at 394; Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 
565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 
(3d Cir. 2001).  
 164. Bell, 799 F.3d 379. 
 165. Id. at 383. 
 166. Id. 
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described a particular weapon that he would use on the coaches as a 
“rueger [sic],”167 encouraged other students to join these actions, and 
warned the coaches to “watch their backs” because they would receive no 
mercy.168 The school suspended Bell because of the rap song.169 
Sitting en banc, a divided Fifth Circuit extended the Tinker 
“substantial disruption” rule170 to speech made completely online and 
away from the school’s campus when the speaker intended the speech to 
be seen by the scholastic community.171 In upholding Bell’s suspension, 
the court found that it was reasonably foreseeable the rap would cause a 
“substantial disruption” on the school’s campus, particularly when Bell 
admitted172 that he intentionally directed the rap song to be heard by the 
school’s student body.173 Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit appears to have 
created a new standard that allows schools to regulate off-campus speech 
intentionally directed at a school’s student body—speech “constitut[ing] 
threats, harassment, and intimidation, as a layperson would understand the 
                                                                                                             
 167. This reference apparently is a misspelling of the Ruger firearm brand. 
Ruger is a firearm producer that manufactures millions of firearms each year, 
including various models of handguns. See Ruger History, RUGER CORP., 
http://www.ruger-firearms.com/corporate/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) [https://perma 
.cc/4R66-ZTHR]. 
 168. Bell, 799 F.3d at 396–97. 
 169. Id. at 385. 
 170. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding 
that conduct that materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or 
invasion of the rights of others is not immunized by the First Amendment). 
 171. See Bell, 799 F.3d at 383. For the purpose of this Comment, the 
correctness of the Fifth Circuit’s extension of the Tinker principle beyond the 
forum of the school house is assumed without analysis. But see, for example, 
Katherine E. Geddes, First Amendment—Student Speech—Why Bell Tolls A 
Review of Tinker’s Application to Off-Campus Online Student Speech, 69 SMU 
L. REV. 275 (2016), for a view critical of the Fifth Circuit’s extension of the Tinker 
principle to reach online speech. 
 172. Bell, 799 F.3d at 396. The Fifth Circuit found that Bell’s rap could 
reasonably substantially disrupt school because 
[Bell] admitted during the disciplinary-committee hearing that one of the 
purposes for producing the recording was to “increase awareness of the 
alleged misconduct” and that, by posting the rap recording on Facebook 
and YouTube, he knew people were “gonna listen to it, somebody's 
gonna listen to it”, remarking that “students all have Facebook”. 
Id.  
 173. Id. at 393 (“Our holding concerns the paramount need for school officials to 
be able to react quickly and efficiently to protect students and faculty from threats, 
intimidation, and harassment intentionally directed at the school community.”). 
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terms.”174 This extends Tinker to reach beyond speech occurring at 
school.175 
Four judges dissented from the majority opinion.176 Among their 
concerns, the dissenting judges contended that Tinker, a decision 
concerning armbands worn on school property, was ill-suited to address 
this question and that Tinker had been extended beyond what the Supreme 
Court intended by being applied to online and off-campus speech.177 
Additionally, the dissenters were concerned that by allowing a state actor 
to restrict speech a layperson understands to be threatening, harassing, or 
intimidating, “the majority opinion fail[ed] to apprehend that reasonable 
minds may differ about when speech qualifies as ‘threatening,’ 
‘harassing,’ or ‘intimidating.’”178 
The majority of the United States circuit courts that have considered 
the issue have extended Tinker and applied its substantial disruption 
standard to off-campus speech in cyberbullying cases.179 Since Tinker was 
decided in 1969, six circuits have considered whether Tinker should apply 
to off-campus speech.180 Five circuits, including the Fifth Circuit, have 
applied Tinker to off-campus speech.181 The Third Circuit has an intra-
                                                                                                             
 174. Id. at 397 (“Accordingly, . . . there is no genuine dispute of material fact that 
Bell threatened, harassed, and intimidated the coaches by intentionally directing his 
rap recording at the school community, thereby subjecting his speech to Tinker.”). 
 175. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
 176. Id. at 403–36. 
 177. Id. at 424 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (“Tinker does not authorize school 
officials to regulate student speech that occurs off campus and not at a school-
sponsored event, where the potential ‘collision’ of interest upon which Tinker’s 
holding pivots simply is not present.”). 
 178. Id. at 418. 
 179. See Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 
34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573–74 
(4th Cir. 2011); S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee's Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 
771, 777 (8th Cir. 2012); Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1069 
(9th Cir. 2013); Bell, 799 F.3d 379. 
 180. Bell, 799 F.3d at 393. 
 181. See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35 (applying Tinker to an eighth grader’s 
off-campus creation and Internet transmission of an icon that depicted and called 
for the killing of a teacher to 15 friends); Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573–74 (finding 
that when a student created and posted on an online webpage, “the School District 
was authorized by Tinker to discipline Kowalski, regardless of where her speech 
originated, because the speech was materially and substantially disruptive in that 
it ‘interfer[ed] . . . with the schools’ work [and] colli[ded] with the rights of other 
students to be secure and to be let alone.’” (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513)); 
S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson, 696 F.3d at 777 (“Thus, student speech that causes a 
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circuit split concerning Tinker’s application to off-campus speech.182 The 
remaining circuits appear not to have addressed the issue.183 Because Bell 
is the Fifth Circuit’s most recent decision regarding state’s authority to 
restrict online speech, Bell’s extension of Tinker to reach online speech 
informs any analysis of and potential amendments to Louisiana’s 
cyberbullying statute. 
2. State v. Bishop: North Carolina’s Analysis of the State’s 
Cyberbullying Law 
Responding to cyberbullying related suicides, several states have 
imposed criminal sanctions.184 North Carolina is one of these states.185 In 
2016, North Carolina’s Supreme Court declared a portion of that state’s 
cyberbullying statute unconstitutional in State v. Bishop.186 The portion of 
the statute in question criminalized “[p]ost[ing] or encourage[ing] others 
to post on the Internet private, personal, or sexual information pertaining 
to a minor” with the “intent to intimidate or torment a minor.”187  
                                                                                                             
substantial disruption is not protected. Based on the cases below and on the 
District Court’s finding that NorthPress was ‘targeted at’ Lee’s Summit North, 
we believe Tinker is likely to apply.”); Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1069 (“[W]hen faced 
with an identifiable threat of school violence, schools may take disciplinary action 
in response to off-campus speech that meets the requirements of Tinker.”). The 
circuit courts disagree concerning the appropriate standard with which to apply 
Tinker. See Petra Ingerson Bergman, Off-campus Freedom of Speech and Tinker: 
Political Protest to Bullying, U. CIN. L. REV. (Feb. 15, 2017), https://uclawreview 
.org/2017/02/15/off-campus-freedom-of-speech-and-tinker-political-protest-to-bul  
lying/#_ftn47 (“Tinker is integral to the three cases involved in the current circuit 
split concerning the application of Tinker, and its progeny, to the ability of schools 
to regulate off-campus speech and the appropriate standard under which to analyze 
off-campus speech. On one side, the Eighth Circuit held that the proper test to 
analyze the ability of schools to regulate or discipline off-campus speech is whether 
it was ‘reasonably foreseeable’ that the speech would reach the school and cause a 
‘substantial disruption.’ On the other side, the Fourth Circuit held that the proper 
test was the ‘nexus’ test that holds that certain degree of intertwinement between 
the school and the speech will justify regulation by the school.”) (internal footnotes 
omitted) [https://perma.cc/RN5Z-BE3R]. 
 182. See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219–20 (3d Cir. 
2011) (Jordan, J., concurring) (discussing that Tinker’s applicability to off-
campus speech remains unresolved in the Third Circuit). 
 183. Bell, 799 F.3d at 394. 
 184. See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 17.  
 185. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1 (2017). 
 186. State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 820 (N.C. 2016). 
 187. § 14-458.1(a)(1)(d). 
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During the 2011–2012 school year, Robert Bishop, the bully, and 
Dillion Price, the victim, were classmates.188 Throughout the school year, 
Bishop and others bullied Price on Facebook.189 In September, a classmate 
posted a screenshot190 of a “sexually themed text message” Price 
mistakenly sent to him.191 Price, Bishop, and several others commented on 
the post.192 Subsequently, at least two similar Facebook posts involving 
“comments and accusations about each other’s sexual proclivities, along 
with name-calling and insults” followed, all involving Price, Bishop, and 
others.193 That December, Price’s mother found him very upset, throwing 
things, and hitting himself in the head.194 After learning about the 
comments and pictures that Price’s classmates had posted and fearing for 
his well-being, Price’s mother contacted the police.195 On February 9, 
2012, Robert Bishop was arrested and charged with violating North 
Carolina’s cyberbullying statute.196  
The North Carolina Supreme Court found that the state’s statute did 
not fall within one of the narrow, traditional exception to First Amendment 
protections.197 Likewise, the statute failed to raise the pedagogical 
concerns central to Tinker.198 Because the statute criminalized certain 
speech purely because of its content, the statute was a content-based 
speech restriction subject to strict scrutiny.199  
In its strict scrutiny analysis, the North Carolina Supreme Court 
observed that protecting children from cyberbullying is a compelling 
government interest.200 In spite of furthering this compelling interest, the 
                                                                                                             
 188. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 815. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Screenshot, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/screen 
shot (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) (“Also called screen capture. a copy or image of 
what is seen on a computer screen at a given time.”) [https://perma.cc/7FR5-HFR8]. 
 191. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 815. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 816. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See id. at 821 n.3 (stating that the court need not consider a hypothetical 
statute which would criminalize a true threat although the court acknowledged 
this might present a “closer constitutional question”). 
 198. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 
(1969) (holding that a student’s conduct that materially disrupts classwork or 
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is not immunized 
by the First Amendment right to free speech). 
 199. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 819. 
 200. Id. 
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court held that the provision in question was not the least restrictive means 
of accomplishing that interest and was, therefore, unconstitutional.201  
The Court expressed concern that “the statute contain[ed] no 
requirement that the subject of an online posting suffer injury as a result, or 
even that he or she become aware of such a posting.”202 Additionally, the 
Court was troubled by the overbreadth of the provision concerning criminal 
motive of the poster and content of the posting.203 North Carolina’s 
cyberbullying statute forbade the motive to “intimidate or torment” and 
subsequently neglected to define either term that, absent a clear definition, 
included protected speech.204  
The statute also failed to define exactly what it sought to prohibit when 
it broadly forbade publishing “private, personal, or sexual information 
pertaining to a minor.”205 These broad, undefined terms criminalize 
protected speech “that a robust contemporary society must tolerate because 
of the First Amendment.”206 For these reasons, the North Carolina Supreme 
Court held that the state’s cyberbullying statute was a content-based speech 
restriction that failed to survive strict scrutiny because the statute was “not 
narrowly tailored to the State’s asserted interest in protecting children from 
the harms of online bullying.”207 Because the Louisiana and North Carolina 
cyberbullying statutes share the common interest of protecting children from 
harmful online speech and raise the corresponding overbreadth concerns,208 
Bishop’s strict scrutiny analysis of North Carolina’s cyberbullying statute can 
inform an analysis of the Louisiana statute’s constitutionality. 
III. ANALYZING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOUISIANA’S 
CYBERBULLYING STATUTE 
Bells sound when one tinkers with the freedom of speech—even when 
one intends to protect children.209 In attempting to protect minors from 
cyberbullying by criminalizing certain messages, Louisiana’s cyberbullying 
                                                                                                             
 201. Id. at 820–21 (“The protection of minors’ mental well-being may be a 
compelling governmental interest, but it is hardly clear that teenagers require 
protection via the criminal law from online annoyance.”). 
 202. Id. at 820. 
 203. Id. at 821. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 822. 
 208. Compare LA. REV. STAT. § 14:40.7 (2017), with Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 
819–21 (N.C. 2016). 
 209. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
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statute raises First Amendment concerns.210 To determine the 
constitutionality of Louisiana’s cyberbullying statute under the United 
States Constitution, the court must analyze the statute through the 
jurisprudential doctrine of strict scrutiny and any applicable exceptions to 
strict scrutiny. Additionally, Louisiana’s cyberbullying statute must be 
considered in light of Louisiana’s own constitutional protections of the 
freedom of expression. 
A. Louisiana’s Cyberbullying Statute 
In 2010, Louisiana enacted a statute that criminalizes “the transmission 
of any electronic . . . communication with the malicious and willful intent to 
coerce, abuse, torment, or intimidate a person under the age of eighteen” in 
an attempt to stop cyberbullying.211 An offense under this statute “may be 
deemed to have been committed where the communication was originally 
sent, originally received, or originally viewed by any person.”212 Further, if 
the offender is under 17 years old, Title VII of the Louisiana Children’s 
Code governs the matter exclusively.213 The statute neither expressly raises 
the schoolhouse disruption concerns central to Tinker nor addresses any of 
the traditionally limited genres that would exempt the statute from the strict 
scrutiny’s application.214 For Louisiana’s existing criminal cyberbullying 
statute to be constitutional, the statute must be one of the rare cases to 
survive strict scrutiny. 
B. Applying Federal First Amendment Jurisprudence to Louisiana’s 
Cyberbullying Statute 
The First Amendment forbids interference with the inalienable and 
fundamental right to free speech unless a statute survives strict scrutiny or 
satisfies one of the jurisprudential exceptions.215 As a general rule, the First 
Amendment establishes that the government cannot “restrict expression 
                                                                                                             
 210. See Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (“And 
whatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, 
‘the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s 
command, do not vary’ when a new and different medium for communication 
appears.” (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952))). 
 211. § 14:40.7(A). 
 212. § 14:40.7(C). 
 213. § 14:40.7(D)(2). 
 214. See § 14:40.7. 
 215. See supra Part I.B.2.; Part II.A. 
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because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”216 
Jurisprudential exceptions to this general rule exist for traditionally restricted 
speech genres and speech raising pedagogical concerns.217 Any content-based 
speech restriction not falling under one of these jurisprudential exceptions is 
subject to strict scrutiny.218 
1. Louisiana’s Cyberbullying Statute Fails to Survive the Two-
Pronged Test of Strict Scrutiny 
Louisiana’s cyberbullying statute forbids speech based on its content by 
criminalizing a communication “with the malicious and willful intent to 
coerce, abuse, torment, or intimidate.”219 Because Louisiana’s cyberbullying 
statute restricts speech based on the message it expresses, the statute is a 
content-based restriction;220 consequently, because it does not fall within one 
of the jurisprudential exceptions to First Amendment protections, the statute 
is subject to strict scrutiny.221  
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that protecting 
children from certain kinds of speech is a legitimate interest.222 Like North 
Carolina’s cyberbullying statute analyzed in Bishop, Louisiana has a 
compelling interest in protecting its children from the harmful effects of 
cyberbullying.223 Louisiana expresses this concern by criminalizing 
cyberbullying only when it is directed at a “person under the age of 
eighteen.”224 Like the North Carolina statute, however, Louisiana’s statute 
fails to use the least restrictive means to accomplish that goal.225 In failing 
                                                                                                             
 216. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 
U.S. 60, 65 (1983)). 
 217. See supra Part II. 
 218. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 219. § 14:40.7(A). 
 220. See § 14:40.7; Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015); 
State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 820 (N.C. 2016). 
 221. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (explaining that content-based restrictions on 
speech are subject to strict scrutiny). 
 222. See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“[T]he 
District Court concluded that while the Government has a legitimate interest in 
protecting children from exposure to indecent dial-a-porn messages . . . . We agree.”). 
 223. § 14:40.7. See State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 819 (N.C. 2016). 
 224. § 14:40.7(A) (“Cyberbullying is the transmission of any electronic textual, 
visual, written, or oral communication with the malicious and willful intent to 
coerce, abuse, torment, or intimidate a person under the age of eighteen.”). 
 225. See Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 820. 
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to specifically define several of the statute’s key terms, the overly broad 
statute restricts speech that is protected by the First Amendment.226 
The failure of Louisiana’s criminal cyberbullying statute to define 
“transmission,” “malicious,” “willful,” “coerce,”227 “abuse,”228 “torment,” 
and “intimidate” raises serious constitutional concerns.229 For example, 
Merriam-Webster defines “transmission” as “(1) the act or process of 
sending electrical signals to a radio, television, computer, etc; (2) something 
(such as a message or broadcast) that is transmitted to a radio, television, 
etc.”230 Using Merriam-Webster’s definition, Louisiana’s cyberbullying 
statute criminalizes “transmissions” that the legislature likely did not intend, 
such as a Facebook “share” or Twitter “retweet” 231 of a message originally 
conveyed by someone else. 
Additionally, a transmission, under the lay definition, arguably covers 
the social media phenomenon in which large numbers of people submit 
demeaning or disparaging comments to run anonymously through 
accounts that then broadcast the message to a thousand or more of the 
account’s followers.232 Although criminalization of these transmissions 
may be constitutional if the speech falls under a traditionally limited genre 
or under Tinker, it is unclear whether the legislature intended to criminalize 
these kinds of speech.233 Also, though the statute’s requirement that an 
individual possess a “malicious and willful intent” narrows the scope of 
proscribed speech, failing to define the terms “coerce, abuse, intimidate, or 
                                                                                                             
 226. See § 14:40.7(A). 
 227. For a common definition, see Coerce, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014) (defining “coerce” as “[t]o compel by force or threat <coerce a confession>”). 
 228. For a common definition, see Abuse, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014) (defining “abuse” as “(1) To damage (a thing). (2) To depart from legal or 
reasonable use in dealing with (a person or thing); to misuse. (3) To injure (a person) 
physically or mentally”). 
 229. § 14:40.7(A). 
 230. Transmission, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dic 
tionary/transmission (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) [https://perma.cc/GDF8-ST98].  
 231. See FAQs about Retweets (RT), TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com 
/articles/77606 (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) (“A Retweet is a re-posting of a Tweet. 
Twitter’s Retweet feature helps you and others quickly share that Tweet with all 
of your followers. You can Retweet your own Tweets or Tweets from someone 
else.”) [https://perma.cc/5P45-6U6D]. 
 232. See, e.g., LA HS confessions (@LAHighSchool898), TWITTER, 
https://twitter.com/LAHSConfession (last updated May 11, 2016) (containing a 
Twitter account that posts anonymous messages from Louisiana high school 
students—messages that often contain degrading and inflammatory messages) 
[https://perma.cc/Q3G6-N5HR].  
 233. See supra Part I.B.2; Part II.A. 
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torment” causes the statute to prohibit an impermissibly broad spectrum of 
speech.234  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “malicious” as “[s]ubstantially certain 
to cause injury” or “[w]ithout just cause or excuse” and “willful” as 
“[v]oluntary and intentional, but not necessarily malicious.”235 Further, 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “coerce” as “[t]o compel by force or 
threat.”236 Without a clearly defined and proscribed intent standard and 
using Black’s Law Dictionary definitions, “coerce” may criminalize 
electronic transmissions of messages by a student seeking to compel another 
student to act by threatening to no longer be friends with her if she spoke to 
a particular person. Further, Merriam-Webster defines “intimidate” as “to 
make timid or fearful: frighten; especially: to compel or deter by or as if by 
threats.”237 Using this definition, “intimidate” may include electronic 
messages traditionally known as “trash talking” before a big high school 
football game.238 
There is no requirement that the bullying speech be seen or have any 
effect upon any victim.239 Transmission of the ill-defined proscribed 
speech alone is sufficient to warrant criminal sanctions, regardless of 
whether the speech has any effect.240 Louisiana’s cyberbullying statute 
fails to survive strict scrutiny because it does not embody the least 
                                                                                                             
 234. See § 14:40.7(A). 
 235. Malicious, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Willful, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) Black’s Law Dictionary defines willful as 
Voluntary and intentional, but not necessarily malicious. . . . A voluntary 
act becomes willful, in law, only when it involves conscious wrong or 
evil purpose on the part of the actor, or at least inexcusable carelessness, 
whether the act is right or wrong. The term willful is stronger than 
voluntary or intentional; it is traditionally the equivalent of malicious, 
evil, or corrupt. 
Id.  
 236. See Coerce, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 227. 
 237. For a common definition, see Intimidate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www 
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ intimidate (defining “intimidate” as “to make timid 
or fearful: frighten; especially: to compel or deter by or as if by threats <tried to 
intimidate a witness>”) (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) [https://perma.cc/CD6B-FJTG]. 
 238. “Trash talking” traditionally is a part of competitive athletics. For a list 
purporting to rank the top ten sports trash-talkers of all time, see Jim Haldem, The 
10 Greatest Trash Talkers in the History of Sports, GOLIATH (Oct. 5, 2015), 
http://www.goliath.com/sports/10-greatest-trash-talkers-in-the-history-of-sports/5/  
[https://perma.cc/78RN-U26V]. 
 239. See § 14:40.7(A). 
 240. See id. 
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restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest.241 The statute 
fails to specifically and narrowly define each type of speech it attempts to 
criminalize.242  
2. Louisiana’s Cyberbullying Statute Fails to Use the Traditional 
Genres or Tinker 
The Louisiana Legislature may prohibit speech constituting a true 
threat, incitement, fighting words, or obscenity because the First 
Amendment does not protect these traditionally restricted genres.243 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that state actors may restrict 
certain types of speech related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.244 
Louisiana’s cyberbullying statute, however, does not track the language of 
either of these jurisprudential doctrines.245 Therefore, Louisiana fails to 
provide minors with constitutionally permissible protection from certain 
types of cyberbullying.246 Nevertheless, speech restrictions that satisfy the 
minimal constitutional standards under the United States Constitution may 
not satisfy Louisiana’s constitutional safeguards of the freedom of 
expression.247 
C. Applying Louisiana’s Constitutional Protections to Louisiana’s 
Cyberbullying Statute 
The Louisiana Constitution protects freedom of expression by 
providing that “[n]o law shall curtail or restrain the freedom of speech or 
of the press. Every person may speak, write, and publish his sentiments on 
any subject, but is responsible for abuse of that freedom.”248 The Louisiana 
Supreme Court has yet to delineate the boundaries of the Louisiana 
                                                                                                             
 241. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (holding that 
a city’s content-based restriction on speech was unconstitutional when the law in 
question failed to satisfy strict scrutiny). 
 242. See § 14:40.7. 
 243. See supra Part I.B.2.; see, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717–
18 (2012) (reciting content-based speech restrictions that have been permitted in a 
few historical categories, including incitement, fighting words, and true threats). 
 244. See supra Part II.A.; see, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that conduct by a student which materially 
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of 
others is not immunized by the First Amendment right to free speech). 
 245. See § 14:40.7(A). 
 246. See id. 
 247. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 248. Id. 
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Constitution’s guarantee of the freedom of expression.249 Each time the 
Louisiana Supreme Court has addressed a freedom of speech issue, it 
decided the issue by relying on the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.250 True to the civilian tradition, however, Louisiana courts 
do not rely on stare decisis.251 In future cases, Louisiana courts will have 
to determine the boundaries of Louisiana’s freedom of expression by 
examining the Constitution’s text.252 Louisiana’s Constitution clearly 
protects freedom of speech, but what qualifies as an impermissible “abuse” 
of that freedom is unclear.253  
The theory of “new federalism,” in which state constitutions are 
expansively interpreted to provide broader protections of individual rights 
than the limited boundaries set by the federal constitution,254 has not yet 
                                                                                                             
 249. See, e.g., Brown v. State Through Dept. of Pub. Safety and Corrs., La. 
Gaming Control Bd., 680 So. 2d 1179, 1183 (La. 1996) (recognizing Louisiana’s 
separate constitutional provisions but ruling the speech restriction at issue 
unconstitutional solely on First Amendment grounds) (“R.S. 27:13(C)(6) is 
clearly unconstitutional under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
insofar as it prohibits contributions to committees supporting or opposing ballot 
measures.”); see also Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 891–92 (La. 1977) 
(holding that a restriction of expression to be unconstitutional solely under the 
United States Constitution because “[i]n the instant case it was not necessary for 
us to define such a standard for Louisiana because we found the expressions in 
question to be opinions fully protected by the minimum federal standards”). 
 250. See supra note 249. 
 251. Judicial opinions may provide guidance or be persuasive but are not 
independent sources of law. Louisiana does not adhere to the common law doctrine 
of stare decisis. See Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 128 (La. 2000), 
opinion corrected on reh’g, 782 So. 2d 573 (La. 2001) (“Judicial decisions . . . are 
not intended to be an authoritative source of law in Louisiana.”). The Louisiana 
Supreme Court has recognized that the civilian principle of jurisprudence constante 
can lead to a rule of law becoming part of Louisiana’s custom. Id. at 128–29 (“Under 
the civilian tradition, while a single decision is not binding on our courts, when a 
series of decisions form a ‘constant stream of uniform and homogenous rulings 
having the same reasoning,’ jurisprudence constante applies and operates with 
‘considerable persuasive authority.’” (quoting James L. Dennis, Interpretation and 
Application of the Civil Code and the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. 
REV. 1, 15 (1993))). 
 252. LA. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 253. See id. 
 254. See Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: 
State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KY. L.J. 421, 425–26 (1974); see 
also Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 59 (Colo. 1991) (“Colorado’s 
tradition of ensuring a broader liberty of speech is long. For more than a century, 
this Court has held that Article II, Section 10 provides greater protection of free 
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been recognized by the Louisiana Supreme Court as a method of enlarging 
the scope of Louisianans’ right of expression guaranteed by the Louisiana 
Constitution.255 Louisianans’ freedom of speech is protected, at a 
minimum, to the degree demanded by the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, but the Louisiana Constitution may provide greater 
speech protections than the First Amendment.256  
                                                                                                             
speech than does the First Amendment.”); Woodland v. Mich. Citizens Lobby, 
378 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Mich. 1985). The Michigan Supreme Court has endorsed 
new federalism for its constitution:  
[That the Michigan] constitution may afford greater protections than the 
federal constitution is also well established and is based on fundamental 
constitutional doctrine and principles of federalism. The Michigan 
Constitution has been interpreted as affording broader protection of some 
individual rights also guaranteed by the federal constitution's Bill of 
Rights . . . . [I]t is clear that the Michigan Constitution may afford 
broader free expression and petition protections against government 
infringements.  
Woodland, 378 N.W.2d at 343 (internal footnotes omitted); Robins v. Pruneyard 
Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) 
(acknowledging that the state constitution may provide greater protections than 
those found in the United States Constitution when holding California’s 
Constitution protects the freedom of speech and petition even when exercised in 
privately owned shopping centers).  
 255. See State v. Schirmer, 646 So. 2d 890, 904–05 (La. 1994) (Dennis, J., 
concurring). But see State v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779, 784 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (finding 
that the Louisiana Constitution’s article 1, §§ 5 and 7, read in concert, afford greater 
protections for anonymity than can be found in the United States Constitution). 
 256. See State v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779, 784 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that 
the Louisiana Constitution’s article 1, §§ 5 and 7, read in concert, afford greater 
protections for anonymity than can be found in the U.S. Constitution). While on 
the Louisiana Supreme Court, former Justice Dennis voiced his concern over the 
court’s refusal to decide a case on Louisiana constitutional grounds. See Schirmer, 
646 So. 2d at 904–05 (Denis, J., concurring) (“I disagree with the majority’s 
pretermission of the state constitutional question. However, because Article I, § 7 
of our state constitution grants as broad and arguably broader protection of rights of 
free speech than the minimum First Amendment safeguards and because I believe 
that the majority has applied those minimum safeguards correctly, I join in the 
judgment of the majority.”) (internal citation omitted). Justice Dennis believed that 
Louisiana should lead in the protections afforded to individual liberty rather than 
simply lag behind the United States’ minimum constitutional standards. See State 
v. Tucker, 626 So. 2d 707, 719 (La. 1993) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (“In reality, my 
colleagues have sunk this court to the lowest pitch of abject followership. They no 
longer believe in our state constitution as an act of fundamental self-government by 
the people of Louisiana. They no longer perceive this court to be the final arbiter of 
the meaning of that constitution, bound by the intent of the drafters and ratifiers as 
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IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FOR LOUISIANA 
Louisiana’s criminal cyberbullying statute, a content-based restriction 
on speech, will be presumed by courts to be an unconstitutional 
infringement upon the inalienable right to free speech under the First 
Amendment.257 Nevertheless, states are allowed to restrict speech in 
limited circumstances.258 For Louisiana’s cyberbullying statute to 
constitutionally achieve its goal of protecting children, the statute must be 
amended to include the language of the traditionally restricted speech 
genres.259 Further, the statute should be amended to restrict speech likely 
to cause a material disruption or substantial disorder in accordance with 
Tinker and the Fifth Circuit’s Tinker-Bell analysis.260 Online speech often 
is as disruptive to the learning process as face-to-face confrontation; 
occasionally, it is more disruptive.261 These changes will constitutionally 
restrain cyberbullying under First Amendment jurisprudence.262 Any other 
cyberbullying restriction not falling within either of these exceptions must 
survive strict scrutiny.263 Moreover, any speech restriction adopted by the 
Louisiana Legislature must comply with state constitutional protections.264 
                                                                                                             
reflected by the text, the drafting history, and this court's constitutional precedents. 
Instead, for them, our state constitution is a blank parchment fit only as a copybook 
in which to record the lessons on the history of the Common Law that flow from 
Justice Scalia’s pen.”). 
 257. See supra Part III.A.–B; see also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 
2218, 2226 (2015) (“Content-based laws . . . are presumptively unconstitutional 
and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored 
to serve compelling state interests.”); Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 
799 (2011) (“It is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its content 
will ever be permissible.” (quoting United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 
U.S. 803, 818 (2000))).  
 258. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717–18 (2012) (explaining 
that content-based restrictions on speech have traditionally been permitted in a few 
historical categories). 
 259. See, e.g., Brown, 564 U.S. at 791. 
 260. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); 
Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 
S. Ct. 1166 (2016). 
 261. See Anderson, Bresnahan & Musatics, supra note 21, at 281 (arguing that 
online bullying is more dangerous than traditional bullying because cyberbullying 
is perpetrated using a broad range of platforms and online comments are often 
permanently, and repeatedly, visible to peers). 
 262. See supra Part I.B.2.; Part II.A. 
 263. See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
 264. See supra Part III.C. 
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A. Amending Louisiana’s Cyberbullying Statute to Survive Strict Scrutiny 
To survive the two-pronged test of strict scrutiny, a state must show a 
compelling interest and use the least restrictive means of achieving that 
interest.265 To survive the compelling interest prong of strict scrutiny, the 
importance of protecting children is vital to the survival of the statute. The 
United States Supreme Court has recognized the necessity of protecting 
children from certain kinds of speech as a compelling interest.266  
In an effort to survive the second prong, the Louisiana Legislature 
attempted to narrowly tailor the statute by requiring a “malicious and willful 
intent” from the poster and criminalizing only speech that is targeted toward 
children under 18 years old.267Louisiana likely criminalized speech that a 
free society must tolerate when it purports to criminalize speech which is 
simply coercive, abusive, or intimidating, using the lay definitions of those 
words.268 For the rare cases in which a content-based speech restriction is 
constitutional under the First Amendment, Louisiana must remove overly 
broad language from its cyberbullying statute and define with particularity 
the speech prohibited by the statute.269 Louisiana should also amend its 
cyberbullying statute to track the language of traditionally limited genres 
of speech to prohibit cyberbullying speech that falls under either one of 
those exceptions. 
B. Amending Louisiana’s Cyberbullying Statute to Include the 
Traditionally Restricted Genres 
Some cyberbullying may fall under the traditional speech 
limitations.270 Louisiana should amend its cyberbullying statute to track 
the language of these jurisprudentially recognized exceptions.271 First, to 
criminalize “fighting words,” the cyberbullying statute should prohibit 
cyberbullying that, by the very posting, “inflict[s] injury or tend[s] to incite 
                                                                                                             
 265. See supra Part II.A. 
 266. See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., 492 U.S. at 126 (“We have recognized that 
there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-
being of minors.”). 
 267. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:40.7(A) (2017). 
 268. See id. 
 269. See Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (“[A statute 
restricting speech for the purported reason of protecting minors] is invalid unless 
California can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny—that is, unless it is justified 
by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.”). 
 270. See id. at 791 (listing traditionally permissible limitations on speech). 
 271. See id. 
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an immediate breach of the peace.”272 Prohibiting “fighting words” 
expressed during online bullying may have a limited practical effect 
because a body of law “limit[s] the fighting words doctrine to face-to-face 
confrontations.”273 Cyberbullying, by its nature, does not occur during 
face-to-face meetings. Therefore, although some cyberbullying may 
qualify as “fighting words,” this exception’s reach will be limited.  
Second, Louisiana’s statute should be amended to prohibit cyberbullying 
that contains obscene material.274 Cyberbullying by posting obscene materials 
happens frequently275 and can have severe consequences.276 To prohibit 
obscene cyberbullying, the statute should prohibit the use of materials that 
deal with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interests to bully another 
person online.277 In Bishop, the purported cyberbully posted arguably 
obscene material; in dicta, the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized 
that the state’s cyberbullying statute may have been constitutional if it had 
tracked the language of the traditional obscenity exception.278 By 
prohibiting cyberbullying using obscene materials, the statute will protect 
                                                                                                             
 272. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 273. Smolla, supra note 83, at 350; see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 
20 (1971) (finding that a provocative message containing a “four-letter word” on 
a jacket did not fall within the fighting words exception because “[n]o individual 
actually or likely to be present could reasonably have regarded the words on 
appellant’s jacket as a direct personal insult.”). 
 274. See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (upholding 
the restriction of obscene dial-a-porn telephone calls for the purpose of protecting 
children). 
 275. See State In Interest of T.R., 2015 WL 6835248 (La. Ct. App. 2015) 
(upholding the discipline imposed by the City Court vis-à-vis a minor child who 
posted obscene photographs that he claimed were taken of female classmates).  
 276. See Celizic, supra note 1 (telling the story of a young lady who committed 
suicide after being subjected to cyberbullying that included her ex-boyfriend 
sending nude photographs of her to other girls at her high school). 
 277. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (“A state offense must 
also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in 
sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken 
as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”). 
 278. See State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 821 n.3 (N.C. 2016) (stating that the 
court need not consider a hypothetical statute that would criminalize a true threat 
although the court acknowledged this might present a “closer constitutional 
question”). 
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many minors who are victimized by bullies who post sexually explicit 
materials online—material that often pertains to the victim.279 
Third, the Louisiana Legislature should amend its statute to prohibit 
cyberbullying containing “true threats” that are “statements where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit 
an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of 
individuals.”280 Prohibiting “true threats” will protect minors from receiving 
messages that place them in reasonable fear for their safety or well-being. 
Lastly, the Louisiana Legislature should amend its statute to prohibit 
“incitement” by criminalizing cyberbullying that both advocates illegal 
conduct and is likely to produce imminent lawless action.281 In addition to 
tracking the traditionally restricted genres, Louisiana should amend its 
cyberbullying statute to restrict speech that can be constitutionally curtailed 
within the Tinker-Bell analysis. 
C. Louisiana Should Amend the Statute to Track the Tinker-Bell Analysis 
The Supreme Court upheld the right of a school district to restrict and 
punish certain types of speech that raise pedagogical concerns.282 If a state 
school may restrict speech to further pedagogical concerns, reasoning a 
fortiori,283 the state legislature may restrict speech if the speech poses a 
material disruption or substantial disturbance to pedagogical concerns 
central to Tinker-Bell.284 The legislature, expressing the sovereign will of 
the people, is even more justified in prohibiting harmful speech that “would 
undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”285 
Under the Fifth Circuit’s Tinker-Bell analysis, the Louisiana Legislature 
may and should prohibit cyberbullying that is intentionally directed at a 
                                                                                                             
 279. See, e.g., Ley, supra note 1 (detailing Hope Sidwell’s suicide after her 
ex-boyfriend shared nude photos of her with their classmates); Dean, supra note 
1 (recounting Amanda Todd’s suicide after a man took nude photographs of her 
during an online chat session and sent them to her classmates); Celizic, supra note 
1 (recounting Jesse Logan’s suicide after a her ex-boyfriend shared nude photos 
of her with their classmates). 
 280. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
 281. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 436 (2007) (citing Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969)). 
 282. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969); Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016). 
 283. A fortiori, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“By even greater 
force of logic; even more so it follows”). 
 284. See, e.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. 503; Bell, 799 F.3d 379. 
 285. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). 
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school community and reasonably foreseeable to cause material disruptions 
of classwork or cause a substantial disruption at school.286 Additionally, the 
Louisiana Legislature may extend Kuhlmeier to prohibit cyberbullying made 
using state property, such as a school computer or a school’s Internet 
connection.287 Once Louisiana’s cyberbullying statute complies fully with the 
United States Constitution, the statute must also comply with Louisiana’s 
Constitution.288 
D. Louisiana Statutes Must Comply with Louisiana’s Constitutional 
Protections 
To comply with the Louisiana Constitution’s guarantee of the freedom 
of expression, the cyberbullying statute certainly must, at minimum, 
comply with the United States Constitution.289 The Louisiana Constitution 
clearly states that no law may restrain the freedom of expression, but that 
prohibition is not absolute.290 A person is responsible for abusing the freedom 
of expression.291 In the absence of Louisiana Supreme Court jurisprudence 
delineating the extent of Louisiana’s constitutional protections, the Louisiana 
Legislature should address the cyberbullying of children as an impermissible 
abuse of the freedom of expression.292 
CONCLUSION 
Despite embodying a compelling interest in protecting children, 
Louisiana’s cyberbullying statute criminalizes speech that a robust free 
                                                                                                             
 286. Bell, 799 F.3d 379; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514(b)(2)(D) (2017) 
(providing that a school principal or her designee has the authority to prohibit 
electronic bullying of a student—bullying that is an actual or reasonably foreseeable 
“[s]ubstantial disruption of the orderly operation of the school or educational 
environment”). 
 287. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding 
that a school may censor speech in made in a school sponsored student paper when 
the school’s actions are “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”). 
 288. See supra Part III.C. 
 289. Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 891–92 (La. 1977) (holding that a 
restriction of expression was unconstitutional because it failed to meet the 
minimum federal requirements without addressing the state constitutional issue). 
 290. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 291. Id. 
 292. See id. 
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society must tolerate.293 The statute fails to survive strict scrutiny, does not 
fall within the traditional or Tinker-Bell exceptions, and impermissibly 
restricts the inalienable right of free speech enshrined in the First 
Amendment.294 It is imperative for a compassionate society to act so that 
no family will have to senselessly lose another Megan, Phoebe, Ryan, 
Jesse, Hope, Jamey, Amanda, or Katlin.295 But any protective action must 
be accomplished in a constitutional manner. To afford children maximum 
protection against cyberbullying, Louisiana’s cyberbullying statute should 
be amended to track the jurisprudential language of the traditional and 
Tinker-Bell exceptions to First Amendment protections. Any criminal 
cyberbullying statute must embody the least restrictive means of 
protecting children from this online threat.  
 
Randall Morgan Briggs 
 
                                                                                                             
 293. See State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 821 (N.C. 2016) (“Civility, whose 
definition is constantly changing, is a laudable goal but one not readily attained 
or enforced through criminal laws.”). 
 294. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (holding that 
a city’s content-based restriction on speech unconstitutional when the law in 
question failed to satisfy strict scrutiny). 
 295. See Megan’s Story, supra note 1; Hodge & Murphy, supra note 1; 
Halligan & Halligan, supra note 1; Celizic, supra note 1; Ley, supra note 1; 
James, supra note 1; Dean, supra note 1; Wilson, supra note 1. 
  J.D./D.C.L., 2018. Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. 
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